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THE NATURE OF BANKRUPTCY
MAX RADiN t
The word bankrupt is a good English word deliberately Latinized
from the French.1 It was used in ordinary speech and writing almost
as early as it was used in the law .merchant, where, of course, it prop-
erly belonged. 2 When it became a word of the common law it already
had a history behind it and was little more fixed and precise in its con-
notations than it is now.
The accumulation of three hundred and more years have made
the word even less precise because its use has become more extended
and in no instance limited." When the phrase "on the subject of bank-
ruptcies" was used in the Constitution, it had an aura of suggestion
and emotion about it. But it had at least one definite implication. This
was that a law on the subject of bankruptcies was a law similar to the
statutes which had been passed on this subject in England and the
colonies since the time of Henry VIII.4
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I. The form banqueroute was the French version of the Italian banca rotta and it
came into mercantile usage from the French. CoTGRAVE, FRENCH-ENGLISH Dict.
(1611) terms it banqueroutte. The form "bankrupt" is by analogy with words like "ab-
rupt". Cf. NEv ENGLISH DICr. (Oxford) 1, 6 Cowell's etymology in THE INTER-
PRETE (1637) from "route" in the sense of "way" is, of course, untenable, but it was
close to the then commonest act of bankruptcy which was the absconding of the debtor.
It is curous to note that Cowell's fantastic etymology is accepted by COKE, 4 INST. *277.
2. The first instance in law cited by the Oxford Dictionary is from a state paper
of 1539. The instance cited from MoRE, APOLOGY, c. XXI, is dated 1533.
3. In Louisville Joint Stock Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (ig3s), the Frazier-
Lemke Act was declared unconstitutional not because it exceeded the bankruptcy power,
but because it violated the Fifth Amendment. This is specifically stated. Id. at 589.
The statement in WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935) 9, needs
a slight qualification.
4. 8 HOLDSWoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (ist ed. 1925) 229-245. The statute
of 1542, 34-35 HEN. VIII, C. 4, seems to have been the first formal legislative enact-
ment, although the Council had interfered earlier on behalf of both the creditors and
the debtor.
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There was no reason why the process of development should have
ceased-indeed there was no way in which it could have ceased-on
the adoption of the Constitution. Bankruptcy as a need of commercial
life was bound to gather further experience and so to enlarge its tangi-
ble limits and would also necessarily intensify its emotional sugges-
tiveness, since the background of new bankruptcy legislation or of new
expansion of bankruptcy by decisions was almost certain to be that
of commercial crisis.
5
One attempt at a definition was eminently scientific. It was that
of Mr. Justice Catron in In re Klein: 6
"Congress has general jurisdiction; and the true inquiry is---
To what limits is that jurisdiction restricted?
"I hold it extends to all cases where the law causes to be dis-
tributed the property of the debtor among his creditors; this is its
least limits. Its greatest is a discharge of the debtor from his
contract. And all intermediate legislation, affecting substance and
form, but tending to further the great end of the subject---:distri-
bution and discharge-are in the competency and discretion of
Congress."
Story, many years earlier, in his commentary on this provision,
declares : 7
"Perhaps, as satisfactory a description of a bankrupt law
as can be framed is, that it is a law frot the benefit and relief of
creditors and their debtors in cases in which the latter are unable
or unwilling to pay their debts. And a law on the subject of
bankruptcies in the sense of the Constitution is a law making
provisions for cases of persons who fail to pay their debts."
Obviously, it is not a question of logic. The term "bankruptcy"
may or may not be a category that can be separated per genus et dif-
ferentiam from other related and similar categories. We are con-
cerned with a legal process that is meant to perform an important com-
mercial function.
What function? That of enabling creditors to get their debts paid
after they have reduced them to judgment? Clearly not, since that
is the function of the ordinary writs of execution and the many writs
in aid of execution, both legal and equlitable. May the function then
S. Louisville Joint Stock Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 58r (1935); WAEEN,
loc. cit. supra note 3; Hanna, Agriculture and the Bankruptcy Act (x934) ig MINN. L.
RE.I.
6. I HOW. 277 (U. S. 1843) reversing the decision in the District Court [Fed. Cas.
No. 7,865 (D. Mo. 1843)] which held a discharge from pre-existing debts to be uncon-
stitutional.
7. COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrruTION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 1113, n. 2. The
book was first published in 1833.
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be described as the attempt to prevent debtors from overreaching their
creditors by concealing or disposing of their assets? 8 This again is
performed by processes, originally equitable in their nature but now
generally gathered under statutes that seek to prevent fraud on cred-
itors. Bankruptcy must add something new to these two types of
process or else it would never have come into existence.
In his valuable little book on Bankruptcy in United States His-
tory, Mr. Charles Warren distinguishes three stages in the develop-
ment of American bankruptcy, the "Period of the Creditor, 1789-
1827", the "Period of the Debtor, 1827-1861", and the "Period of
National Interest, 1861-1935".9 It is clear that the creditor, the debtor
and the national interest were concerned with bankruptcy in all its
American stages, although it may well be that one or another of these
three elements was most considered at the different periods indicated
by Mr. Warren. And if we follow the history of bankruptcy back into
the experience of England, we shall find that while the "national" in-
terest was at no time non-existent-since considerations of public
morality were often enough alleged-the interest of the creditor was
almost exclusively kept in view, until under Anne a more or less qual-
ified discharge of the debtor was made possible.
How was the interest of the creditor served? After all, with fieri
facias, capias and, later, with the Statute of Elizabeth at his command,
what need did a creditor-so long as he was a single creditor-have
of any new method of controlling an evasive debtor, the decoctor of
the Roman law? That is, of course, just the point. A single creditor
could have got along without a bankruptcy procedure. But if there
were many creditors, any one stood in great danger of being left in
the lurch by the greater good-fortune, insistence, harshness or skill in
intrigue of some of his fellow-creditors. Equity could do something
for him in the single case of collusion or fraud. But that was obvi-
ously not sufficient.
It will be well to keep in mind, therefore, that bankruptcy posits
a plurality of creditors, although once established its process may well
be used by a single creditor. If we follow the course of bankruptcy
from the earliest statute-that of Henry VIII in I542-to the Chandler
Act, we shall find that whatever else was present or absent, there was
always some method by which all the creditors were compelled to accept
8. This was clearly the announced purpose of the earliest statutes of bankruptcy.
Cf. HOLDSWoRTH, loc. cit. supra note 4. It is still one of the purposes of bankruptcy
since a fraudulent conveyance is one of the most important of the "acts of bankruptcy".
But fraudulent conveyances can be reached in law and equity without the intervention
of bankruptcy.
9. (Cambridge, 1935.) The book is an expansion of the lectures delivered on the
Julius Rosenthal Foundation at Northwestern University in 1934.
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some arrangement or some disposition of their claims against the bank-
rupt's property, whether they all agreed to it or not.
Everything else is clearly incidental. The bankrupt might be
stripped of all his property and thrown into prison. He might be
allowed certain exemptions. He might be relieved of his debts or have
them scaled down or postponed. All these are stages of increasing
humanity toward an unsuccessful member of the commercial com-
munity. He might even be helped to reconstruct and carry on his busi-
ness, and this, with a view to maintaining an economic unit that in-
volved a great many persons who are not properly creditors.
But whatever happens to the debtor, in every case the creditors
have been assembled in some formal way, their claims examined and
classified, and assigned for satisfaction in definite proportions to an
existing or prospective fund. The extent of the participation of the
creditors in reaching a final disposition is also irrelevant. Whoever
initiates the process and however it is done, the important thing, is that
the bankruptcy court or commission rounds up the creditors and com-
pels them to adjust or discharge their claims in a particular way.
Evidently the correctness of this test of a bankruptcy law will
depend on whether a purely and exclusively voluntary arrangement
on the part of creditors is a bankruptcy process. Such voluntary ar-
rangements are of course well known. They take the form of composi-
tions.10 All the creditors may meet with the debtor and agree to
accept a fraction of their claims and to release the debtor from the
balance. Such compositions may be regulated by a specific statute giving
validity to'them only if certain forms are followed. Are they thereby
made methods of bankruptcy and is a statute regulating them a statute
on thd subject of bankruptcy? Evidently not, so long as any creditor
may refuse to take part in the arrangement and may refuse to agree
to the release. If, on the contrary, the statute undertakes to bind him
to agree whenever a definite number of creditors have done so, there
ought to be no doubt that the statute is on the subject of bankruptcy,
even if it sedulously avoids the words "bankrupt" or "discharge" in
its entire extent."
The same thing may be said of conveyances for the benefit of
creditors. A debtor may wish to liquidate his business privately. If
he can induce all his creditors to cooperate in this, there is no reason
to call it bankruptcy. The ordinary process of law and equity will
io. On the whole question of composition, cf. GLENN, LIQUIDATION (1934), 160-
171. The validity of the agreement for those creditors who assent, is past all doubt.
8 WILLISTON AND THOMPSON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1938) § 126.
ii. WARREm, op. cit. supra note 3 at 44-45, quoting the interesting statements of
Hayne in 1837, in which the difficulty of getting consent of all creditors is emphasized.
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carry out the purposes of the parties.' 2  But if a creditor-even a
single one out of hundreds-is to be coerced into cooperation, that can
be accomplished only through the intervention of bankruptcy.
The criterion becomes more difficult if the coercion takes the
form of a sort of persuasion, that is almost if not quite coercive. A
common form of "state insolvency law" which seeks to avoid being
called a "law on the subject of bankruptcies", is one that gives cred-
itors who consent to a composition and sign the required release, all
the property the debtor has at the time, leaving to non-consenting cred-
itors in theory their claims intact but in fact merely a chance of getting
paid if the debtor should get some more non-exempt property at some
later time, provided he does not choose to go into bankruptcy proper
before that. A choice of this type presented to the creditor is a poor
example of persuasion, and is so close to legal coercion that realistically
minded persons might find it difficult to call it anything else. If, how-
ever, it is taken to be less than a coercive measure it may save the stat-
ute from being classified as one "on the subject of bankruptcies", which
apparently was the purpose of those who had the statute enacted.13
The essence of bankruptcy, accordingly, is not that the debtor's
property is impounded 4 nor that the creditors are affected, nor even
that all of them are affected. Something additional is required. Un-
less we intend to bring the creditors into one large group, and adjust
their common claims to a fund consisting of a single debtor's property,
there is no reason to have recourse to bankruptcy.
12. Cf. GLENN, LIQUIDATION (1935) § 187: "Minute statutory regulation of the
general assignment does not destroy its original character of a trust" It is in this
connection that the effect of federal legislation on state "insolvency laws" has been most
studied. Williston's article on the subject in (1909) 22 HAnv. L. REV. 547 is the first
careful survey, since the earlier article of I. 1. Williams in (1902) 5o AmE. L. REG.
211 is merely a special plea for a restrictive interpretation. The most recent cases on
the subject are Johnson v. Star, 287 U. S. 527 (1933), 42 YALE L. J. 1140; Pobreslo
v. Joseph M. Boyd Co., 287 U. S. 518 (933), 32 MIcH. L. REv. 93; International Shoe
Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261 (1929), 42 HAnv. L. REv. 823. All of these cases have
been much commented on in the law reviews. The fullest bibliography is in HANNA
A McLAuGHLIN, CASES AND MATEALS ON CREDITORS' RIGHTS (3d ed. 1939) 465-
468.
13. GLENN, LIQUMATION (935) § 187. The three cases mentioned above do not
quite go to the length of saying that pressure of this sort placed upon creditors in order
to secure their consent to a release of the debtor is essentially different from a dis-
charge. There seems to be no doubt that if a discharge, or the equivalent of a dis-
charge, is really effected, the statute is "on the subject of bankruptcies". A discharge
undoubtedly works a coercion on creditors. But the absence of a discharge can obvi-
ously not save the statute from being so classified. See Mulder and Solomon, Effect
of the Chandler Act upon General Assignments and Compositions (1939) 87 U. oF PA.
L. REV. 763.
14. Mr. Garrard Glenn in an able and brilliant article, Essentials of Bankruptcy
(1937) 23 VA. L. REV. 373, finds that control of the debtor is an indispensable condi-
tion of bankruptcy jurisdiction and when this control is lacking, as in municipal bank-
ruptcies, the bankruptcy power fails. Undoubtedly, English bankruptcy began with
action directed against the bankrupt. And, undoubtedly, unless there is a debtor whose
relations are to be adjusted, there is no occasion for bankruptcy. But the prevention
of inequality of distribution, which involves coercion on some or all creditors, would
seem to be as fundamental.
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If the law simply wipes out the claims altogether, we may be deal-
ing with an economic measure of the highest importance, but it is not
bankruptcy. Such laws, let us remember, are not unexampled in history.
At various times in ancient society there was a demand that all debts
be cancelled as of a certain date. The Biblical Jubilee 5 and the
Athenian seisachtheia 16 seem to have been measures of this sort. The
Roman tabulae novae undoubtedly constituted one. 17 Whether any
emergency can justify so drastic a relief of insolvents may be disre-
garded for the present. The question of constitutionality under the
due process requirement would certainly arise. Later courts might
overrule the Radford case "I and hold that the Fifth Amendment is
qualified by the bankruptcy clause instead of vice versa. But what
happens in aj general cancellation of debts or a repudiation is not that
all creditors of a single debtor have been assembled into a class to have
their claims adjusted, but that the class of creditors has been wiped
out. There are no creditors to assemble and there is no claim to adjust.
It may be well to remember that an effective cancellation can be
obtained not only by the formal Roman expedient of tabzdae -novae,
but by a deliberate and immense inflation. This was the case in Ger-
many before 1923, when the circulating medium was reduced in value
below the paper it was printed on and was nonetheless legal tender
for pre-existing debts. Whatever this method is called, it can scarcely
be called one of bankruptcy.
The same must be said of a general moratorium. If all cred-
itors are required for a definite or indefinite time to suspend the en-
forcement of their claims, that surely affects debtors and creditors and
is an eminent and obvious relief for the former. But it is not a matter
of bankruptcy. A moratorium like the German one of 1914 might in
the United States be justified under the war power.19 Perhaps other
I5. LEviTicus'C. 25; DEUTERONOMY c. I5. The interminable controversies on the
exact effect of these provisions need not concern us. That in DEUTmONOMY at least
a remission of debts was provided for seems likely enough.
16. See LINFORTH, SOLON THE ATHENIAN (IgIg) 269.
17. Ldcrivain, Tabulae Novae (1914) 5 DAREMBERG-SAGLIO, Dicr. DES ANTIQuI-
Trs 13, 14; 4 MOMMSEN, HIST. OF ROME (1898) 523, 524. Partial remissions of debts
in Rome under stress of circumstances were frequent enough. An especially drastic
one was the Valerian law of 86 B. C. The reactions of the time toward these drastic
debtor relief laws were as violent as the passages quoted in WARREN, op. cit. suPra note
3, at 31. The Valerian law of 86 B. C. that scaled all debts down to 75% was called
"an utterly disgraceful law" by Velleius Paterculus, II, 23, 2. Cicero said of a general
remission, OFF. c. II 84, "What reason can there be for a general remission except that
if I give you money to buy an estate for me, you get the estate, but I lose the money."
18. Louiville Joint Stock Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935).
ig. Justice Brandeis calls attention to the fact that the war power has also been
declared subject to the Fifth Amendment. Louisville Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555
(1935) n. 19, and cites Hamilton v. Kentucky Distillers, 251 U. S. 146 (1919).
Moratoriums in the form of "stay-laws" have been frequently passed by the various
states in times of economic stress. These were for the most part ultimately declared
void by the courts. Cf. Feller, Moratory Legislation (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. i16o-
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occasions for a moratorium might be secured under the treaty power,
or even under the general welfare clause. But a moratorium immo-
bilizes the class of creditors. It does not force them to adjust their
claims. Indeed, it professes to leave their claims intact, even though
a claim enforceable now is not the same as a claim enforceable in a year.
The presuppositions, purposes, and machinery of a moratorium are
essentially different from those of bankruptcy even if both may con-
tain the common element of the relief of debtors.
The presence or absence of a coercive element as a test of a bank-
ruptcy law is not to be confused with the contrast between the words
"compulsory" ("involuntary") and "voluntary", as these terms are
used, not only in the National Bankruptcy Acts but in most discussions
of bankruptcy, notably in Mr. Warren's book.20 These terms are there
used exclusively from the point of view of the debtor. Proceedings
initiated by him are called "voluntary"; those initiated by creditors are
called "involuntary". That at one time all proceedings were initiated
by creditors and that it was only within recent times that the debtor
was allowed to do so,21 is an important fact in legal and commercial
history, but it does not affect the nature of bankruptcy. Every form
of enforcement of a debt is "involuntary" as far as the debtor, is con-
cerned. But it is a different matter when coercion is applied to one
tr more recalcitrant creditors. This involves the exercise of a judi-
cial control that could not be readily carried out under either the equity
or the law powers of the Anglo-American court system, and necessi-
tates a special and peculiar apparatus designated by the special and
peculiar name of bankruptcy.
And the coercive element is obviously not lacking in compositions
made under the old bankruptcy laws or under Chapter XI of the
Chandler Act.22  It was the need of justifying a composition provision
in bankruptcy that induced Justice Blatchford to fall back unneces-
sarily on the expansive rhetoric of Story's assertion in the Commen-
taries.23  In all compositions under a bankruptcy act the composition
is effective when a specified fraction of the creditors agree. The re-
1185, where a list of moratoria up to that time is given. Cf. also WAuN, op. cit.
supra note 3 at 146-159; Sternberg, Three Types of Relief Legislation (1935) 24 GEo.
L. J. 82-97; Vaughan, Reform of Mortgage Foreclosure Procedure-Possibilities Sug-
gested by Honeyman v. Jacobs, (194o) 88 U. oF PA. L. REV. 957. The most striking
example of a special moratorium (rent) was the New York statute upheld in Marcus
Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 17o (1921). Cf. in general, Worthen v.
Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56 (1935) ; Richmond Co. v. Wachovia Co., 300 U. S. 124 (1937)
I5 N. C. L. REV. 273-276, and Home Bldg. Loan Co. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934).
20. WARREN, op. cit. supra note 3 at 6o-64, 85-87, 135-138.
2r. The first act that permitted bankruptcy to be initiated by the debtor was the
Act of 1841. 5 STAT. 440 (I841).
22. 52 STAT. 840, ii U. S. C. A. r et seq. (Supp. 1938).
23. In re Reiman, 2o Fed. Cas. No. 11,673 (S. D. N. Y. 1874).
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mainder are bound willy-nilly. Even if all agreed, it would only be
after they had all been assembled with or without their consent under
supervision of the court and instructed to find a formula. If they had
not found one, the court would have found one for them. The coer-
cive element is open and unmistakable.
If we turn to the two definitions which have so frequently been
cited on this question, it is clear that Story's is scarcely usable even
as a general guide. It is a tempting refuge, when a law is challenged,
to place it in a category so wide that almost anything will fit into it.
So, when Story says that a law that makes "provision for the cases
of persons who fail to pay their debts" is on the subject of bankrupt-
cies, he cannot quite mean what he says, unless he wishes to include
laws dealing with executions, attachments, fraudulent conveyances,
24
and the like.
Indeed the case of "debtors who fail to pay their debts" or, as
Mr. Warren puts it, are unable to,25 cannot be the essence of bank-
ruptcy, since under the law, perfectly solvent persons, i. e., who both
can and wish to pay their debts, can be adjudicated bankrupts. But if
they do, they certainly are putting into motion a process that coerces
creditors into accepting settlements arrived at in a way different from
that which, except for bankruptcy, they might have chosen.
The repetition of this definition both in cases and in legal liter-
ature omits to take into account the fact that the subject of bank-
ruptcy is either a special phase of commercial regulation or it has no
excuse for existence. And in all the cases in which Story's definition
has been cited, the actual law has conformed to the determining test
here suggested, a coercive force on one or more creditors, as indicated
primarily in grouping the creditors into a complex class whose rights
in the debtor's property are to be determined.
The definition of Justice Catron,26 on the other hand, while emi-
nently scientific in assigning maximum and minimum limits of exten-
sion will not quite serve our purpose. The maximum limlit, the dis-
charge of! debtors, is a little too large, since it would include cancella-
tion or repudiation of all debts or a general moratorium. The mini-
24. The Chandler Act has incorporated the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,
since a fraudulent conveyance is an act of bankruptcy. Obviously that has no effect on
the fraudulent conveyance statutes of the several states.
25. WARREN, op. cit. supra note 3 at 8: ". . . any national law which deals with
inability to pay debts and which is uniform throughout the country is a law 'on the sub-
ject of bankruptcy'."
Mr. Warren is supported by the statement he cites (p. 176) of Justice Cowen in
Kuntzler v. Kohans, 5 Hill 317, 321 (N. Y. 1843) : "I read the Constitution thus-
'Congress shall have the power to establish uniform laws on the subject of any person's
general inability to pay his debts throughout the United States.'
26. See note 6 supra.
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mum limit again does not go quite far enough. We do not need to
transfer the debtor's property-the Roman cessio bonorum- at all. If
the creditors are required to readjust their claims to the property he
has or may later acquire, that is enough. The test is satisfied.
It is stated frequently in the discussion of the nature of bank-
ruptcy that a bankruptcy law has certain definite purposes and that the
relief of distressed debtors may well be called the most important
of them. Certainly this fact was most prominently mentioned in the
agitation for bankruptcy laws in the United States, even in the period
that Mr. Warren calls "The Period of the Creditor". The fullest
statement of this purpose isl perhaps that of Mr. Justice Day in Stell-
wagen v. CIuM.2 7 It is equally a fact that the bankruptcy is as Jus-
tice Waite says, one of many examples in which the general welfare
of the community is achieved by mutual sacrifices of various groups
in it.
2 18
But while the purposes of a statute are of paramount importance
in interpreting its provisions, we cannot merely by knowing these
purposes learn what a bankruptcy system is. History and semantics
may perhaps be snubbed but we hardly dare snub functionalism. And
the function of a legal system is not to be separated from the way in
which it works. Whatever purposes bankruptcy attempts to carry
out, it does by working on the creditors primarily, by compelling them
to reorganize their relations to the debtor or to each other in regard
to the debtor's property. No extension of the bankruptcy power has
in fact attempted anything else, whatever the words used may have
been. In the course of this process, bankruptcy can adopt whatever
incidental device may serve the economic and social ends so often
brought out in discussion of the subject. But we need not lose our-
selves in large generalities which might bring the entire law merchant
within the rdnge of Congressional power. That was not even Story's
intention, 29 with all his eagerness to create a federal common law. It
is an indifferently honest way of achieving a result that should hon-
estly be arrived at by deliberate amendment if we need it at all.
27. 245 U. S. 605, 617 (1917) : ". - • a main purpose of the Act intends to aid the
unfortunate debtor by giving him a fresh start in life, free from debts, except of a cer-
tain character, after the bankruptcy has been administered for the benefit of creditors."
28. Canada Southern R. R. v. Gebbard, 109 U. S. 527, 536 (i883).
29. LiFE AND LETnas OF JosEPH STORy (1851) II, 330, cited in WARRxN, op. cit.
stpra note 3 at 6o.
